No Takers: Why Americans Won't Work These Jobs

Efforts to reshore manufacturing jobs from China to the United States are once again gaining political momentum. Former President Donald Trump, along with several others in Washington, continues to argue that bringing back factory work is essential to revitalising the American middle class and restoring domestic industrial strength.

But the problem isn’t just a matter of where the factories are. It’s about who will work in them. Manufacturers across the United States are finding that the types of physically demanding, low-wage jobs once sent abroad no longer appeal to American workers — especially not to the younger generations. As a result, the return of these jobs is running into a wall: a labour market that has fundamentally changed.

What Are These Jobs, and Why Were They Offshored?

The roles in question are often low-skilled manufacturing positions that require long hours, repetitive tasks, and physical stamina. Examples include textile machining, electronics assembly, metal casting, and plastics processing. These were precisely the types of jobs that were outsourced en masse in the 1990s and 2000s, mostly to China, due to significantly lower labour costs and fewer regulations.

Reshoring advocates hope that shifting production back to the U.S. will improve supply chain resilience and reduce dependence on foreign nations. However, the strategy assumes that domestic workers will be ready and willing to fill those roles. So far, this assumption has proved flawed.

American Workers Have Moved On

The modern American workforce has different expectations. Younger workers in particular — Millennials and Gen Z — place a premium on work-life balance, clean and safe environments, career development, and meaningful engagement. Many prefer service or technology sectors where they can work remotely, earn tips, or engage with digital tools. Traditional factory jobs offer few of these benefits.

In addition, more Americans than ever before are college-educated. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, over 38% of adults aged 25–34 now hold a bachelor’s degree or higher. With that comes a natural aversion to jobs perceived as “unskilled” or lacking in long-term prospects. Even for those without degrees, warehouse work or gig economy jobs often pay similarly while offering greater flexibility.

Generational and Cultural Disconnect

There is also a generational pride gap. For many Baby Boomers, factory work was seen as honest labour — a reliable path to a home and pension. But among younger Americans, factory work is rarely seen as aspirational. It is often associated with low status, minimal pay, and a sense of industrial decline.

Geography compounds the issue. Many of the towns where manufacturers hope to locate or expand are in rural or semi-rural areas with ageing populations and dwindling youth. Meanwhile, the bulk of young, working-age Americans are concentrated in urban and suburban centres where opportunities outside of manufacturing are abundant.

What Employers Are Facing

Manufacturers trying to fill these jobs are encountering widespread resistance. Several companies have reported offering signing bonuses, retention incentives, and higher starting wages — to little avail.

In Ohio, a small electronics assembler increased its hourly rate by 20% and still couldn’t fill entry-level positions. In North Carolina, a textile company raised pay to $18 per hour and offered free training, but turnover remained high and applicants were scarce.

Workers who have tried these jobs often cite exhausting shifts, lack of air conditioning, and rigid scheduling as deal-breakers. Some leave within days. Others avoid applying altogether, knowing that better alternatives exist even in lower-paying service sectors.

Immigration Used to Fill the Gap — Now It Doesn’t

Historically, many of these industrial roles were filled by migrant workers — especially in agriculture and light manufacturing. But tighter immigration policies, pandemic-era visa backlogs, and increasing border enforcement have shrunk that workforce significantly.

Meanwhile, China’s labour market — the one Trump’s reshoring agenda aims to counter — continues to benefit from a still-strong pool of rural migrants who are willing to relocate and take up industrial roles. The U.S. no longer has that kind of domestic labour surplus.

Political Rhetoric vs. Economic Reality

The mismatch between policy ambition and economic reality is stark. Politicians often frame reshoring as a patriotic duty — a return to national strength. But there is a risk of over-romanticising the industrial past while ignoring current labour dynamics.

Bringing a factory back to Michigan or Alabama is one thing. Staffing it with motivated workers at competitive wages is another. Unless the job quality and career prospects improve, reshoring efforts may stall — or rely heavily on automation, which further limits job creation.

What’s Next

• Labour shortages will persist: Expect continued difficulty in filling low-wage factory jobs unless there is a fundamental rethinking of compensation and working conditions.

• Policy changes required: To make reshoring viable, policymakers may need to consider immigration reform, vocational education investment, and wage subsidies for essential industries.

• Shift to high-value manufacturing: The most promising reshoring efforts will focus on advanced manufacturing — semiconductors, electric vehicle components, green tech — where wages are higher and skills align better with current workforce expectations.

• Watch for automation: As labour proves difficult to attract, more firms may accelerate automation and robotic assembly to meet production needs without hiring en masse.

Author: Ricardo Goulart